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Introduction  
 In transitioning from a normative theory of global justice to consideration of human 
rights policies of a sovereign, a functional definition of human rights is necessary.  Definitions 
will facilitate or limit consensus of sovereigns. Lack of consensus compels further investigation, 
inquiry, and debate. Whether an event has violated human rights must be established. 
Recognized consensus on the definition of human rights allows for more immediate 
consideration of ethical and moral implications of action or inaction.  Whether an event has 
violated human rights becomes per se. In theory and logic, recognized consensus allows for 
expedited determinations by sovereigns regarding need for intervention and form of intervention 
(e.g. economic sanction, military response).  Although relative responsibility of sovereigns, such 
as the response of the United States versus the response of Ghana to international crisis, may 
require additional political determinations, the primacy of action is not lost.   
 In this paper, I will critique Jack Donnelly’s emphasis on positive rights in formulating a 
comprehensive doctrine of human rights. This critique forms the thesis of traditional human 
rights, or negative rights, as most essential to the definition of human rights in limiting future 
genocide or atrocity assuming a pluralistic society.  By defining human rights within the context 
of traditional negative rights, greater consensus is possible among and between sovereigns 
allowing prompt action and greater protection of human life. This quasi-statist position will be 
defended employing supporting philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, Maurice Cranston, John Rawls, 
Thomas Nagel, and Joshua Cohen. 
 
Critique of Donnelly 
When considering rights, a common philosophical distinction exists between positive 
rights and negative rights. There is a qualitative difference between these types of rights when 
viewed from the perspective of the individual. Positive rights commonly refer to participatory 
rights of citizens.  An example of an American positive right is the right to education.  Examples 
of positive rights often challenged by American and British conservatives include the right to 
food, healthcare, or housing.  These positive rights require more than mere recognition and 
compliance by others but active participation. Jack Donnelly holds these positive rights to be 
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economic and social in nature, extending to even cultural rights.1 Ultimately, it is these rights 
which lend toward entitlements to socially provided goods, services, and opportunities.2 Positive 
rights require that others provide active support.  Hence, a violation of a positive right involves 
“only failing to provide assistance, a (presumably lesser) sin of omission.”3
Conversely, negative rights commonly refer to freedoms from encroachment by the 
government or others.  They prohibit intrusion on individuals. Essentially, these negative rights 
are certain liberties which afford redress or sanction if unfairly encroached. In American 
constitutional theory, negative rights are found in many protections afforded by the Bill of 
Rights.  These include First Amendment freedoms such as speech and free exercise of religion. 
“Negative rights require only the forbearance of others to be realized”.
 
4 Thereby, violation of a 
negative right “involves actively causing harm, a sin of commission”.5
In International Human Rights, Jack Donnelly offers a modernity argument for the 
development of human rights citing massive development post-World War I with the Jewish 
Holocaust serving as the catalyst. Donnelly also refutes the qualitative difference between 
negative and positive rights.
  
6 Donnelly maintains that negative rights are essentially civil and 
political rights; whereas positive rights are economic and social rights.7 Donnelly argues all 
human rights “require both positive action and restraint by the state if they are to effectively 
implemented”.8 Therefore, both require endeavoring and forbearance.  Donnelly cites examples 
of the right to vote, due process, and trial by jury as common civil and political, or negative, 
rights. Furthermore, “[s]ome rights, of course, are relatively positive.  Others are relatively 
negative.  But this distinction does not correspond to the division between civil and political 
rights and economic and social rights.”9
                                                 
1 Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights, Third Edition (Westview Press, 2007) at 25 
 Donnelly’s analysis attempts to destroy fundamental 
distinctions between positive and negative rights by analyzing the role of government in 
enforcing these rights. This perspective, however, is decided government-centric and western. A 
right to democratically elected representation is assumed as are standards of western legal 
2 Ibid  
3 Ibid  
4 Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights, Third Edition (Westview Press, 2007) at 26 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
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procedure. Most notably, an expansive definition of negative rights is treated.  The analysis is 
based on government action or inaction, not the subject. It is the action, or restraint, of 
government which determines the qualitative character of the right as opposed to the impact on 
the subject.  This treatment of government as separate from the citizenry contradicts the basis of 
governmental legitimacy. The basis of legitimacy being development of laws by the citizenry 
themselves. 
By emphasizing the citizenry and limited rights, the distinction between positive and 
negative right is better applied to the study of international human rights.  It is the impact upon 
the subject, or citizen, which is the core of human rights and related violations.  Whatever the 
philosophical perspective regarding the origin of human rights – religious or secular – the impact 
upon the individual, or collection of individuals, is the catalyst for action by sovereigns. In 
limiting the purview of international human rights to essential negative rights agreed upon by 
most liberal societies (i.e. right to life), a more apolitical standard for human rights enforcement 
is possible. When these fundamental negative rights, or liberties, are violated by a government or 
citizenry the world community is able to react in a timely manner.  In considering the post-World 
War I context given by Donnelly, the Armenian, Jewish, Yugoslavian, Rwandan, and Sudanese 
genocides share the common characteristic of a grossly negligent response time by the 
international community.  As human life is systematically destroyed, the international 
community confers. 
Donnelly then proceeds to draw moral equivalence between violations of positive and 
negative rights.  Does it really make a moral difference if one kills someone through neglect or 
by positive action?10
                                                 
10 Ibid at 27 
 The answer is yes. Neglect assumes a more expansive definition of duty 
than a positive act.  Determination of duty is based on relationships and is therefore political.  
Determination of duty is also based on understanding of the self.  In a pluralist society, duty is 
often determined by theological perspective or personal philosophy.  Even assuming a common 
religion, the understanding of duty therein may differ.  The understanding of duty varies widely 
within segments of the major religions – Judaism, Islam, and Christianity – despite a 
fundamental recognition of some form of relationship between God and Man.  The secularist, 
humanist, agnostic, and atheist are similar in varying determinations of duty.  Ultimately, 
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pluralism makes the determination of duty a significant obstacle. An expansive definition of duty 
promotes greater disagreement. 
Alternatively, limiting the human rights question to one of response to positive action 
serves to more clearly define duty. Prohibited actions, such as the direct taking of life, are more 
easily recognized and addressed.  Political determinations by sovereigns regarding duty, which 
require time and deliberation, are also limited.  The economic and social model of positive rights 
advanced by Donnelly results in lost lives based on lack of consensus. A traditional negative 
rights model is most appropriate based on the contemporary politics and inability to prevent 
genocide since the drafting of the Uniform Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).   
 
 
Traditional Negative Rights as Most Essential 
 The critique of Jack Donnelly serves as the basis for a limited definition of human rights 
whereby traditional negative rights are found to be most essential.  As a normative theory, 
placing limits on what constitutes human rights does not prohibit future growth or breadth of the 
definition.  In considering how human rights should or ought to be defined, we tailor definition 
based on realities of history and contemporary politics.  The potential for development toward a 
more liberal, progressive, or Marxist ideal is not impossible.  This determination is for future 
analysis.  Instead, the foundation is established to preserve the most fundamental human rights 
by recognizing the continued inability to respond effectively to genocide and other human rights 
violations. 
 
Hobbesian Assumption 
In considering international reaction to human rights issues, I will assume a Hobbesian 
position that international relations are a state of nature which then requires a realist political 
theory.  This position serves as the most powerful argument for international skepticism 
regarding international relations.11
                                                 
11 Beitz, Charles, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1970) at 28 
 Nonetheless, Hobbes philosophy of the state of nature being a 
state of war is particularly prescient given the current wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, 
continued Middle East conflict, and military posturing of a resurgent Russia. This state of the 
nature argument allows for a right of nature as well.  This is the right to self-sufficient being with 
the ability to protect oneself. Hobbes holds states are autonomous because people are 
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autonomous; thereby a sovereign is necessary to establish justice.  Hobbes extends this analysis 
to the international scene.  Internationally, a state of nature exists because there is no sovereign 
to establish justice.   
As a result, the response to any international humanitarian crisis requires a political 
determination by the sovereign to ensure any relief does not adversely impact their self-
sufficiency financially or otherwise. Despite the crisis, the state of nature still exists. Therefore, 
to preserve the most basic liberties, such as a right to life, one must attempt to limit the 
Hobbesian argument.  The state of nature assumption is best limited by reducing application.  
This is accomplished by limiting the need for determination of relief through a narrow 
understanding of when relief is appropriate.  A traditional definition of human rights as 
traditional negative rights best removes Hobbes assumption.  Maurice Cranston, the British 
philosopher and economist, provides support for this position. 
  
Cranston and Authentic Human Rights 
As Maurice Cranston argues in Political Theory and Rights of Man, “a philosophically 
respectable concept of human rights has been muddled, obscured, and debilitated in recent years 
by an attempt to incorporate into it specific rights of a different logical category”12 Contrary to 
Donnelly’s emphasis of positive rights, Cranston maintains the “traditional human rights are 
political and civil rights such as the right to life, liberty, and a fair trial”.13  These rights are 
contemporary negative rights requiring forbearance of intrusion.  Donnelly, and other modern 
human rights scholars, offer the expansive definition of human rights based on positive right 
theory including economic and social rights. Cranston responds to this redefinition of human 
rights with both philosophical and political objections.14  The philosophical objection is the new 
theory of human rights is illogical.15  The political objection is the new theory confuses human 
rights and hinders protection of more actual human rights.16
Cranston, writing in 1967, recognizes the then recent evolution of human rights agreed 
upon by Donnelly.  Cranston notes “[t]he reason for the revival is perhaps to be sought in 
history, first, in the great twentieth century evils, Nazism, fascism, total war, and racialism, 
 
                                                 
12 Hayden, Patrick, The Philosophy of Human Rights: Paragon Issues in Philosophy (Paragon House, 2001) at 164 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
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which have all presented a fierce challenge human rights; and secondly, in an increased belief in, 
or demand for, equality of men.”17
In 1948 the Uniform Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is drafted to include thirty 
articles.  Cranston correctly recognizes the first twenty articles as traditional negative rights 
commonly held to be natural rights, or rights of man.  However, it is the remaining ten articles 
which Donnelly’s argument would emphasize.  These remaining ten rights are positive rights – 
economic and social – including a right to education and “periodic holidays with pay” in Article 
24 of the UDHR.
  Cranston analyzes the historical growth of rights in keeping 
with the positivist right approach now advocated by Donnelly.  This includes the positivist 
approach followed by Human Rights Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council in 1946.  This positivist approach resulted in objection by some countries, including the 
United State and Soviet Union.   
18
In response to this expansive definition of human rights, Cranston bifurcates rights into 
the categories of legal right and moral right.
  Cranston maintains such economic and social rights are not human rights as 
they cannot be translated into political and legal action. More simply, such rights are virtually 
unenforceable.  
19 It is the specific category of “moral rights of all 
people in all situations” which he holds to be true human rights.20 Universality begs these rights 
be “few” and “highly generalized”21
Cranston argues for a three-part test to determine authenticity of a human right: 
practicability; genuine universality; and paramount importance.
  A limited, generalized understanding allows for greater 
agreement and further negates the politics of relationship.  When considered from a classical 
perspective, the distributive justice requirement of geometric or arithmetic proportionality, in 
recognition not response, is effectively removed.  The station or situation of the claimants need 
not be exhaustively considered.  In turn, the political differences of conferring sovereigns may be 
disregarded for action.   
22
                                                 
17 Ibid  
 Practicability relates to both 
rights and duties.  The individual cannot be charged with the impossible; nor can they can be 
guaranteed the impossible.  Genuine universality relates to the right apply to everyone not 
18 Ibid at 165 
19 Ibid at 167 
20 Ibid at 168 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid at 169 
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specific classes, groups, or demographics. Finally, paramount importance relies on the 
“utilitarian philosophy which analyses moral goodness in terms of the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number”.23 Cranston notes common sense affords an understanding of the essential 
services (i.e. ambulance) as opposed to non-essential (i.e. fairs and camps).24
Maurice Cranston ultimately limits the definition of human rights to those traditional 
negative rights recognized by most countries, including freedom of movement, right to life, right 
to liberty, and right to fair trial. It is these rights whose violations serve as an “affront to 
justice”.
 
25
 
 These traditional negative rights also allow for consensus among divergent societies.  
This overlapping consensus regarding human rights is supported by John Rawls understanding of 
public reason and related legal theory. 
Rawls’ Law of Peoples and Legal Theory Lexicon  
 The Law of Peoples by John Rawls analyzes justice by construction of the original 
position where actors choose principles of justice.26 Rawls then extends these individual 
principles of justice to nations and international law. Rawls philosophy supports the thesis of 
negative rights as most essential to human rights.  The international law envisioned by Rawls is 
more limited than Seyla Benhabib and Jurgen Habermas.  A positive right to democracy is not 
guaranteed.  Moral powers, including a capacity for justice and idea of the good, are deemed 
necessary for society.27  Although Rawls assumes a pluralistic society, he argues liberal societies 
with different comprehensive doctrines, such as Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, may find a 
political element or overlapping consensus.  This overlapping consensus then forms a public 
reason.28
                                                 
23 Ibid at 171 
  This public reason will be limited which lends more favorably to a limited negative 
rights definition of human rights.  The positive rights emphasis of Donnelly will fail to establish 
public reason whereas negative rights foster greater universality.  Rawls clearly states the law of 
peoples requires “a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, 
liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26 Rawls, John, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999) 
27 Ibid at 45 
28 Ibid at 18 
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genocide”.29
It is the principle of toleration which serves as Rawls underlying philosophy regarding 
global justice.
 Violations of these traditional negative rights are “equally condemned by both 
reasonable liberal peoples and decent hierarchical people”.  Therefore, the limited definition 
affords public reason or consensus; consensus then allows prompt determination of action or 
inaction. 
30
This understanding of limited, or basic, human rights and limited intervention is further 
supported by Rawls’ legal theory lexicon. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls maintains his premise of 
justice as fairness as being applicable to international law
  Toleration affords a more limited approach to intervention as opposed to a 
cosmopolitan position.  The toleration principle, itself, trumps a cosmopolitan position which 
may require intervention.  Rawls holds intervention is not permitted among and between liberal 
societies.  Therefore, failure to secure positive rights, social or economic, does not allow 
intervention.  In fact, Rawls precludes interventionist approach in the international sphere 
assuming basic human rights and a system of law, namely a decent hierarchical system of justice, 
exist.  Note Rawls conception of rights is once again basic and not expansive.  These basic rights 
and system of law are most similar to a traditional negative rights approach in coordination with 
Hobbes and Cranston.  Action of a sovereign is warranted on a limited basis contrary to 
cosmopolitan approach holding a country failing to adhere to democratic principles may be 
subject to sanction. 
31
The equal liberty principle holds individuals have equal claim to a scheme of basic 
human rights and liberties.  This schedule of basic human rights and liberties is compatible with 
the same schedule for all others individuals.  In this scheme, only the equal political liberties are 
to be guaranteed their value.  The difference principle relates to social and economic inequalities.  
The equal liberty is superior to the difference principle in cases of conflict. Therefore, to protect 
the interest of the worst off, everyone’s basic human rights, including traditional negative rights 
.  This theory evolves from the same 
Hobbesian presumption regarding social contract theory, namely state of nature as a state of war.  
Once again, the Rawlsian evolution derives from construction of the original position and veil of 
ignorance.  The result being two specific principles of distributive justice: the equal liberty 
principle and the difference principle.  
                                                 
29 Ibid at 79 
30 Ibid  
31 Ibid at 4 
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and liberties including speech and due process, must first be protected. It is the equal liberty 
principle which ensures these basic rights. 
Practically speaking, Rawls lexicon prioritizes the establishment of basic human rights.  
Once these basic human rights are satisfied, questions regarding social and economic inequality 
may be considered so long as the first principle is not sacrificed.  This is analogous to the 
relationship of negative rights to positive rights.  Negative rights, similar to the equal liberty 
principle, are most essential.  Once the negative rights are established more complex questions 
relating to positive rights may be treated. For instance, once the right of life is established as a 
prohibition against genocide or ethnic cleansing, the positive right of a housing, food, or 
healthcare may be considered.  This lexicon allows survives Thomas Nagel’s distinction between 
justice and humanitarian duty. 
 
Nagel and Humanitarian Duty 
   In considering the prospect of global justice, Thomas Nagel differentiates between justice 
and humanitarian duty.32
Nagel makes a distinction between negative rights and associative rights.  The former 
relate to the international and the latter to national sovereignty.  Nagel lists among negative 
rights “those that are supposedly not dependent on a specific form of membership in a specific 
political society.  These include freedom of expression, freedom of religion, pre-political limits 
to the legitimate use of power independent of special forms of association. Presumably these 
rights are not to be associated with socio-economic justice and can be realized voluntarily. Not 
so with rights of association.  These rights emerge only because a political society is brought 
together under a strong, coercive form of centralized control. Here Nagel wants to include a right 
to democracy, the right to equal citizenship, the right to non-discrimination, the right to equality 
of opportunity and the right to be treated fairly in the distribution of socio-economic goods.”
 This distinction advances the thesis of negative rights as most essential 
by transforming the Rawls philosophy of global justice into a moral position.  A principle of 
humanitarian duty, not global justice, is possible according to Nagel.  
33
Negative rights did not clearly relate to a theory of justice because actions relating to 
human rights are humanitarian duties. Associative rights are based in the Rawlsian approach to 
 
                                                 
32 Nagel, Thomas, The Problem of Global Justice (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) at 119 
33 Rasmussen, David, The Possibility of Global Justice: Kant, Rawls, and the Critique of Cosmopolitanism  at 5 
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justice as fairness.  These are essentially social rights. Although Nagel categorizes actions 
relating to human rights as humanitarian duty, the result is no different than Cranston or Rawls.  
The consideration is one of the moral minimum well grounded in a limited definition of human 
rights. In considering the most traditional negative rights of life, liberty, and security, Nagel 
holds “[t]he normative force of the most basic human rights against violence, enslavement, and 
coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue from immediate danger, depends 
on our capacity to put ourselves in other peoples shoes.”34  This relates to both Cranston’s 
genuine universality and Rawls’ equal liberty principle. Nagel continues, “[t]he interests 
protected by such moral requirements are so fundamental, and the burdens they impose, 
considered statistically, so much slighter, that a criterion of universalizability of the Kantian type 
clearly supports them.”35
Therefore, intervention by a state or institution, such as the United Nations, is not a 
matter of global justice but humanitarian duty.  However, as states participation in this 
humanitarian duty is voluntary, it will also be based on a limited conception of negative rights or 
moral minimum.  A similar approach is considered by Joshua Cohen in his development of 
global public reason. 
  
  
Cohen and the Global Public Reason 
In The Egalitarian Conscience, Joshua Cohen offers a political argument as opposed to a 
normative theory for global justice. In the vain of Hobbes, Cranston, Rawls, and Nagel, a limited 
approach to human rights is offered.  The cosmopolitan approach calling for expansive positive 
rights, such as a right to democracy, is not advanced.  
Cohen offers an argument in line with Rawls overlapping consensus and public reason. 
“A conception of human rights is part of an ideal of global public reason: a shared basis for 
political argument that expresses a common reason that adherents of conflicting religious, 
philosophical, and ethical traditions can reasonably be expected to share.”36  The definition of 
human rights must be limited to allowing this sharing.  It cannot be formulated by reference to 
particular religious or secular morality.37
                                                 
34 Nagel, Thomas, The Problem of Global Justice (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) at 131 
 
35 Ibid 
36 Cohen, Joshua, The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen, (Oxford University Press) at 226 
37 Ibid at 237 
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Cohen argues for this same notion of universality cited above coupled with the appeal to 
morality of Nagel.  Cohen maintains human rights have three features.  First, they are “universal 
in being owed by every political society, and owed to all individuals”.38  As they are owed to all 
individuals, Cohen maintains human rights as entitlements.  These entitlements of human rights 
then serve to ensure the qualification for membership.39 Furthermore, human rights may 
command universal assent “only as a decidedly thin theory of what is right, a definition of the 
minimal conditions for any life at all.”40 Second, human rights are “requirements of political 
morality whose force as such does not depend on their expression in enforceable law.”41 Third, 
they are “especially urgent requirements of political morality”.42
Cohen also recognizes specific traditional negative rights, including life and security, as 
associated with demands of basic humanity regardless of membership in an organized political 
society.
  These requirements allow for a 
minimalist definition when considering application.   
43 These threshold rights, as recognized by Cranston, Rawls, and Nagel, must first be 
achieved. Cohen argues the protection of human rights as a “less demanding standard than 
assuring justice” and the related positive rights including a democracy44.  Cohen continues 
“[l]ess demanding, but let us not forget that world would be unimaginably different – many 
hundreds of millions of lives would immeasurably better – if this less demanding but exacting 
standard were ever achieved.”45
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that human rights are “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.46
                                                 
38 Ibid at 229 
  Unfortunately, the UDHR 
then expansively defines human rights by employing a positive rights standard advocated by 
Jack Donnelly.  This expansive definition allows for the infusion of philosophical and political 
principles relating to justice not shared by all countries and societies.  This creates a lack of 
39 Ibid at 226 
40 Ibid at 230 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid at 238 
44 Ibid at 246 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid at 230 
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consensus among and between countries.  This lack of consensus results in a decreased ability to 
react swiftly and appropriately to per se human right violations, including genocide and ethnic 
cleansing. 
 A more narrowly tailored understanding of human rights allows for a recognized 
consensus.  Given the millions of lives lost in various countries through institutionalized murder 
since the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a realist perspective 
regarding human rights is appropriate.  A limited definition of human rights based on a 
traditional negative rights approach is necessary to ensure recognized consensus and limit future 
atrocity. This standard may not serve as a perfect normative theory of global justice.  However, 
the functionality of a traditional human rights approach far outweighs - in human life - the 
philosophical and political jousting of the global justice questions. 
 
 
 
 
